Pekingská akumulácia južného Číny

Najväčší územný spor v Ázii - určujúci suverenitu nad Juhočínskym morom - dosiahol historický zlom v roku 2016, keď medzinárodný tribunál Stáleho rozhodcovského súdu (PCA) v Haagu rozhodol o filipínskom podaní, čím sa objasnilo, že historické záznamy netvoria právny základ pre nárok Číny na 95% mora pri južnom pobreží. Brunej, Malajzia, Filipíny, Taiwan a Vietnam súťažili s Čínou o kontrolu nad 200 námornou míľovou výhradnou hospodárskou zónou (VHZ), ktorá sa tiahla od každého z ich pobrežia. Indonézia a Čína tiež namietali proti vodám toho istého mora okolo skupiny 272 ostrovčekov. Väčšinou to však bola Čína, ktorá poslala svoju pobrežnú stráž do sporných vôd a kultivovala pôdu a tam inštalovala vojenské vybavenie.

Jednomyseľné rozhodnutie tribunálu 12. júla 2016 bolo zosmiešňované Čínou, ktorej minister zahraničných vecí Wang Yi označil rozsudok za „frašku“. Čína sa odmietla zúčastniť na osemmesačnom arbitrážnom konaní a uviedla, že súdu chýba právomoc rozhodovať o otázke námornej suverenity odmietnutím právneho základu svojej pohľadávky, ktorá je zvyčajne vymedzená čiarou s deviatimi čiarami. Čína sledovala využívanie mora k dokumentom používaným vo východnej dynastii Han (23–220 ce). Tieto záznamy spolu s modernejšími dokumentmi vytvorili súčasný čínsky nárok na deväť riadkov. Filipíny podali žiadosť o arbitráž v januári 2013.

Rozhodcovské rozhodnutie zmenilo spor zo zvýšeného nepriateľstva na spor, v ktorom strany hodnotili, či by mohli rokovať s Pekingom. Filipínsky minister zahraničných vecí Perfecto Yasay požiadal „všetkých, ktorých sa to týka, aby sa zdržiavali a triezvy.“ Jeho vláda v auguste poslala do Hongkongu bývalého prezidenta Fidela Ramosa, aby sa stretol s čínskymi predstaviteľmi, aby začal napravovať vzťahy poškodené arbitrážou. Podobne sa v septembri stretol vietnamský premiér Nguyen Xuan Phuc s čínskym premiérom Li Keqiangom. Po rozhodnutí boli aj iní navrhovatelia zmierovacích konaní. „Aj keď súdy dokážu objasniť právne otázky, vyžadujú, aby sa všetky strany dohodli na predložení svojich zistení, čo je v blízkej budúcnosti nepravdepodobné,“ uviedol Tim Johnston z mimovládnej organizácie International Crisis Group.„Určite je v strategickom a ekonomickom záujme každého vyjednávať vzájomne prijateľné riešenie.“

Juhočínske more sa rozprestiera od Taiwanu do Singapuru 3,5 milióna km 2 (1,4 milióna štvorcových míľ) a obsahuje asi 500 malých útesov, väčšinou neobývateľných útesov, atálov a pieskovísk. Tropické more sa cení pre svoje bohaté rybolovné oblasti a zásoby fosílnych palív. Americká energetická informačná správa (EIA) odhadovala, že ropa bola pod hladinou ropy 11 miliárd bbl a zemného plynu 5,4 bilióna m3. Polovica svetovej námornej dopravy využíva aj more.

The sovereignty dispute cropped up in the 1970s with a rise in oil exploration but triggered only sporadic clashes, such as a 1988 incident in which 70 Vietnamese sailors were killed. The quarrel escalated diplomatically in 2012 when it became clear that China was on a mission to expand its holdings, potentially cutting into fishing, fossil-fuel exploration, and coast-guard patrols by the other countries with continental-shelf claims.

In the Paracel archipelago, also claimed by Vietnam, for example, Beijing added hangars, munitions-storage buildings, batteries of surface-to-air missile launchers, and military-use radars at a base on Woody Island. China was also building on Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, which were contested by all five of the other claimants. Beijing reclaimed at least 1,174 ha (2,900 ac) of land while enlarging tiny islets for its use.

• 

• 

When China’s state-invested oil firm CNOOC Ltd. parked an oil rig in May 2014 near the Paracel Islands—waters that Vietnam also claimed—Vietnamese and Chinese vessels rammed each other nearby, and ensuing anti-Chinese protests and rioting in Vietnam resulted in 21 deaths. To protect its claims Vietnam had reclaimed some 50 ha (120 ac) covering at least 27 land features in the sea as of May 2016, according to the U.S. think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Taiwan claimed the entire sea but lacked diplomatic relations in Asia and had not expanded militarily except for work around its airstrip on Taiping, the contested sea’s largest natural land feature. In January 2016 then-president of Taiwan Ma Ying-jeou visited Taiping, claiming that it was an island worthy of an EEZ, an idea the arbitration court rejected.

It was then Philippine president Benigno Aquino III who pushed back hardest against China. On April 8, 2012, a Philippine navy surveillance plane discovered eight Chinese fishing vessels massed near Scarborough Shoal, 198 km (123 mi) west of the Philippines, possibly looking for exotic and protected species. China sent a pair of surveillance ships to stop Philippine authorities from making arrests. For the next two months, their vessels were locked in a standoff, inciting protests in the Philippines and calls for a boycott in China. “I think the short answer to how the situation got to the point where the Philippines chose to pursue the case through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is that it saw that as the only option available to stop the relentless pursuit by China of changing the facts on the ground,” said Carl Baker, director of programs with the Pacific Forum CSIS.

Aquino asked the PCA to rule on the validity of China’s nine-dash line claim and the use of the continental-shelf-based claims of other countries. The request for arbitration was “complementary to the rebuilding of the Philippine armed forces,” said Ramon Casiple of the Philippine advocacy group Institute for Political and Electoral Reform. “At some future time, the Philippines may open talks with China with some leverages on its hands.”

That time might be soon. Southeast Asian maritime claimants relied heavily on trade with and investment from China, the world’s second largest economy. In the event of a war, no one in Southeast Asia could expect to beat the Chinese military, which many ranked the third strongest in the world. In 2014 the Philippines signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with former colonizer the United States, allowing for the stationing of a rotation of U.S. troops in the Philippines and for joint military exercises. Philippine Pres. Rodrigo Duterte, who took office in June 2016, angrily asked the United States to stop the joint exercises as part of what he called a more-independent foreign policy that included alliances with China and Russia. A change to the agreement, however, would require Philippine legislative approval, and in October the U.S. embassy in Manila stated that it planned to keep up cooperation.

China itself wanted to be seen as a good neighbour, particularly after the arbitration verdict. Chinese enterprises depended increasingly on the markets and development needs of surrounding countries, since domestic economic growth had slowed since 2010. Between 2004 and 2013, China’s overseas investments reportedly increased more than 13 times, to $613 billion. Because China outweighed the other claimants militarily and economically, it would have an edge in any bilateral talks.

China considered its informal arrangement with Malaysia to be a template for its dealings with other countries. Malaysian officials seldom sounded off against Beijing’s maritime expansion, analysts claimed, because China was Malaysia’s top trading partner and source of direct foreign investment. The EIA estimated that Malaysia controlled reserves of five billion barrels of crude oil and 2.3 trillion cu m (80 trillion cu ft) of natural gas in the sea, more than the other claimants.

“It’s a two-way street in terms of how much leaders can get,” according to Ibrahim Suffian, program director with the Malaysian polling group Merdeka Center. In Malaysia, he said, “overall the attitude toward China has been more positive and relations are governed by that.”