Bitva o Moskvu (Smieť 2024)
Intenzifikácia a kolaps japonského odporu
Prvky 10. armády, ktoré sa presunuli na juh smerom k hlavným populačným centrám Naha a Šuri, narazili na najsilnejší druh odporu. Rovnako ako v prípade Iwo Jima, Japonec bojoval s veľkou húževnatosťou a podarilo sa mu prinútiť Američanov, aby pre malé zisky utratili veľké straty. Japonské sily brániace oblasť Naha-Šuri mali okolo 60 000 a 1. mája boli tieto jednotky obmedzené na oblasť asi 90 štvorcových míľ (asi 230 štvorcových km) na južnom cípe ostrova. Boj v tomto sektore bol pozičný; obe strany používali pevné línie a obrancovia mali jasnú výhodu v boji z pripravených pozícií. Japonci tiež rozsiahle využívali okinavské jaskyne, ktoré poskytovali vynikajúce útočisko pred americkým bombardovaním.
Američania sa veľmi spoliehali na vynikajúce množstvo a kvalitu svojho vybavenia. Americké sily robili frontové útoky na nepriateľské pozície a postupovali vo vlnách každý deň s ťažkou delostreleckou podporou. Plamene hádzajúce tanky viedli peších proti japonským jaskyniam, ktoré museli byť zničené jeden po druhom. V noci boli pozemné aktivity obmedzené na hliadkovanie a delostrelecké bombardovanie. Keďže Japonci nebrali väzení ani sa všeobecne neponúkli na kapituláciu, boje proti Okinawe v blízkom štvrťroku boli divoké a viedli k smrti.
Intenzita kampane sa odzrkadlila v bitke o „Čokoládový pahorok“, čo je opevnená japonská mohyla strážiaca prístupy k Šuri. Americké sily bojovali trikrát za päť dní na základňu tohto 40-metrového kopca (40 metrov) a zakaždým boli odhodené späť. V jednom šesťhodinovom období prikrývali pozemné a námorné zbrane kopec s 30 000 granátmi, zatiaľ čo bombardéry ho osprchovali ďalšími tonami vysokých výbušnín. Tieto dlhotrvajúce snahy o prepustenie obhajcov však boli zbytočné a pozemné jednotky museli každé japonské opevnenie zničiť jednotlivo, čo bolo únavné, nákladné a nebezpečné. Len na jednej strane kopca mali Japonci asi 500 vstupov do svojich podzemných pozícií a na utesnenie týchto otvorov sa použili náboje dynamitu. Kopec bol nakoniec vzatý americkými silami 16. mája.
The heavily fortified Japanese line, running through Naha on the western coast through Shuri and to Yonabaru on the eastern coast, repelled numerous American attacks. On May 12, however, U.S. forces broke into Naha’s suburbs and proceeded to enter the city, fighting from house to house. Even more intense was the battle for Shuri, keystone of the Japanese fortifications. Shuri fell on June 1, and the important Naha airfield was in U.S. hands by June 6. Despite the breaking of the main Japanese fortified line, opposition did not weaken, and the defenders gave ground grudgingly. However, Japanese manpower was being rapidly exhausted—by mid-June, the largest part of the defending garrison had been killed in action. On June 21 major combat operations ended.
Casualties and legacy
In the end, the Japanese lost Okinawa simply because they had run out of caves and boulders from which to fight and men to do the fighting. The stiffness of the opposition is reflected in the following timetable: from April 4 to May 26, U.S. forces on southern Okinawa had advanced only 4 miles (6.4 km). It took them from May 26 to June 21 to cover the remaining 10 miles (16 km) to the southern tip of the island.
The Americans regarded Okinawa as one of their greatest victories during the Pacific campaign, but the price paid by both sides was enormous. American casualties numbered some 12,000 killed and 36,000 wounded. Buckner, the U.S. ground commander, was killed in action on June 18 while visiting a forward observation post. He was the highest-ranking U.S. officer killed by enemy fire during World War II. On June 22, Ushijima, the Japanese commander, and his chief of staff, Lieut. Gen. Cho Isamu, committed ritual suicide (seppuku) rather than surrender to the Americans. In total, an estimated 110,000 Japanese troops were killed, whereas fewer than 8,000 surrendered. The civilian population of Okinawa was reduced by perhaps one-fourth; 100,000 Okinawan men, women, and children perished in the fighting or committed suicide under orders from the Japanese military. In some cases, families were given a hand grenade to detonate when capture by the Americans seemed imminent.
Kamikaze aircraft, which had first appeared at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, made their peak effort against U.S. warships and transports at Okinawa. Strategically, the kamikaze was a last-resort weapon that Japanese planners hoped would cripple the American fleet and forestall the scheduled invasion of the Japanese home islands. U.S. naval officers’ characterizations of the kamikaze attacks had initially minimized their effectiveness. Mitscher declared as late as June 5 that the attacks were not “too serious” and that only 1 percent had reached their targets. This figure proved to be a significant understatement. While other naval officials also belittled the effect of kamikaze attacks, they did admit that the use of this novel weapon by the Japanese would require changes in U.S. tactics and ship design. In fact, the kamikaze had been brutally effective—of the 34 ships sunk in the battle, 26 were the result of suicide attacks. Casualties among naval personnel were also extremely heavy. Of the 12,281 Americans reported killed in the Okinawa campaign, 4,907 were U.S. Navy personnel. This figure outstrips the battle deaths suffered by both the U.S. Army (4,582) and Marines (2,792) who participated in the punishing ground offensive.
The Allied naval blockade had effectively closed the home islands to foreign imports, and Gen. Curtis LeMay’s strategic bombing campaign had reduced many Japanese cities to rubble, but the Japanese military refused to consider surrender. Based on the experience at Okinawa, American planners conservatively estimated that the U.S. would suffer 225,000 casualties during an invasion of the Japanese home islands; more pessimistic assessments pushed this figure to 1,000,000. Upon succeeding to the U.S. presidency after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, Harry S. Truman was made aware of the Manhattan Project, the top secret U.S. atomic bomb program. Truman told his staff that he hoped that “there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to another,” and this no doubt played a large role in his decision to use the atomic bomb.
In early August 1945 the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Japanese surrendered on September 2, 1945. U.S. forces occupied Okinawa for nearly 27 years, and the island was not returned to Japanese administration until May 15, 1972. Even after the handover, the U.S. maintained sizable military bases on Okinawa into the 21st century. Although the U.S. bases there figured prominently into the shared U.S.-Japanese defense posture in the Pacific, there was significant local opposition to the continued presence of thousands of U.S. troops more than 70 years after the war.
